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Introduction
Performance grabs my attention. These moments of attentiveness are intrigu-
ing as they seem to both precede and coexist with thought and feeling. I am 
struck by performance, by the aural and visual effect. But the notion of being 
stage-struck is synonymous with an infatuation, an emotional feeling. My 
emotionally felt responses, however, are sporadic and inconsistent although 
I do routinely think about what is being emotionally communicated. This 
book ruminates on aspects of drama and theatrical performance that attract 
attention, sustain interest and, on occasion, elicit an emotionally felt response 
and even wonder.
Forms of Emotion explores emotion and its diversity in drama, theatre and 
contemporary performance and the unifying and separating tendencies of 
the emotions, emotional feeling, mood and affect. I find four concepts for 
emotion serve theatrical representation more fully than a bipartite distinction 
between affects and emotions. While theatrical emotion is human-centric, 
it becomes difficult to ignore how the nonhuman world and its species are 
frequently part of emotive language in drama, and regularly feature in the 
settings and staging of theatre and contemporary performance. Forms of the-
atrical emotion encompass nonhuman entities.
The book’s discussion of human and human to nonhuman emotion is 
anchored in classic dramatic narratives and theatrical interpretations that 
make ephemeral conditions such as the emotions, emotional feelings, mood 
and affect comprehensible. Importantly, emotion is constructed within the-
atrical forms. Forms of Emotion affirms that theatrical knowledge and practice 
reflect – and even precede – changes in historical and philosophical beliefs and 
debates about emotion as well as approaches evident in psychology, sociology 
and neuroscience. The concepts grouped under emotion in this book align 
with those used in other disciplines: the emotions are ideas encapsulated by 
words; emotional feelings are physiological experiences of varying duration; 
affect refers to sensitivity to energetic movement and can include embodied 
sensation that is usually short-lived in awareness; and mood denotes a more 
sustained aesthetic effect that connects with individual mood and can reflect 
social mood (see Framing section below; Tait 2021).
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While drama distils the emotions into a written form, theatrical perfor-
mance expands them with bodily forms and the elements of production. The 
analysis of theatrical performance needs conceptual approaches that take into 
account how it presents finely calibrated words and narratives in combina-
tion with physical expression, gesture and movement often surrounded by 
sound, music and the visual effects and material objects of the staging. The 
process of creating theatrical performance involves deliberately assembling 
discrete components into a unified whole. As performance is artistically and 
intentionally arranged, human performers are surrounded with technolog-
ical effects that contribute to the emotional effects. Thus the combined ele-
ments can be challenging to separate out in the reception of performance. In 
one memorable example, I was intrigued that the character, Winnie (Ruth 
Cracknell), in a Sydney Theatre Company production of Samuel Beckett’s 
Happy Days held my attention fully given the performer’s restricted move-
ment (see AusStage 2021). The ageing Winnie, buried in earth to her waist 
then her neck in ‘“poisoned ground”’ (Kelleher 2015: 128), spoke to her taci-
turn husband, Willie, cheerfully but also sadly as she conveyed an intractable 
domestic situation. The aesthetic mood of this particular production, how-
ever, was enlivened by subtle lighting that was constantly moving across the 
nonhuman environment symbolizing human emotional experience. The 
mood also contributed to attentiveness.
Theatre has long provided a social space where the emotions are displayed 
and explained; a specific performance gives them a context and connects sub-
jective experience with a collective perspective. As Erin Hurley explains, feel-
ing in performance ‘moves us out of ourselves by taking subjective experiences 
and inserting them into a social context of meaning and relation’ (2010: 21). A 
context makes it possible to interpret emotional experience and its relational 
circumstances. Theatre history reveals that while performed emotion gener-
ally reflected social values, it often overstepped prescribed limits temporarily 
and offered glimpses of freer emotional experience. Theatre contributes to 
ideas of the emotions circulating within a society and, as pointed out in this 
book, to emotional perspectives on humanness and on the nonhuman world.
Form matters; aural and visual elements communicate emotion as they 
concurrently convey other social significance. Theatrical performance is 
a culturally fabricated art form that seeks to induce responses through its 
artistry; it combines big and small, tangible and less tangible forms. Happy 
Days combined human and nonhuman forms to convey metaphoric ideas 
of living – and dying – as the production evoked spectator affect, mood 
and possibly emotional feeling. A myriad of visual and aural theatrical forms 
deliberately or inadvertently accord value to emotion.
Forms of Emotion argues that as discrete forms of emotion converge in 
drama, theatre and contemporary performance presenting human to nonhu-
man diversity, they reveal both separating and unifying tendencies and ideas 
of emotional freedom. As Richard Grusin points out, humans ‘coevolved, 
coexisted, or collaborated with the nonhuman’, but defined themselves 
BK-TandF-TAIT_9780367644970-211162-Intro.indd   2 04/10/21   5:56 PM
Introduction 3
as separate within the Western cultural tradition (2015: ix). Beliefs about 
emotion reinforce separation in the epistemological designation of nature/
culture and emotion/reason binaries which allow Western culture to frame 
humanity as superior. Yet as Jean-Luc Nancy explains, ‘humans, all of a com-
mon “kind”’, are ‘numerous, dispersed, and indeterminate in its generality’ 
(2000: 7). Judith Butler disputes ‘a normative notion of the human’ framed in 
one category as she argues that the diversity and inequity of human lives and 
deaths must be recognized – and mourned (2004: 33). Emotional feeling both 
facilitates recognition of the diversity of humanity and supports entrenched 
beliefs about separation between humans, and from the nonhuman world. 
Human connections with each other and with the nonhuman nonetheless 
happen in ways that extend beyond thought and agency. As Gilles Deleuze 
and Félix Guattari contend, humans are not separate from their environments 
that unfold through assemblages, and ‘becomings are molecular’ in movement 
that also reaches ‘a given threshold of perception’ and affect (1992: 275, 281). 
These imperceptible and perceptible energetic movements that flow through 
and across bodily forms implicate emotion in such unifying processes.
Bodily forms of human emotions are considered porous even with the sep-
arations created by social roles (Rosenwein and Cristiani 2018). Accordingly, 
embodied feeling in theatrical performance creates an impression of move-
ment and instability that is performative and yet confers distinctive identity. 
Baz Kershaw argues that the co-option of performance as a general para-
digm during the twentieth century means that there are ‘societies in which 
performance is so pervasive that it comes to constitute the human’ without 
adequate recognition of ‘“a performance commons” that it shares with all 
organisms’ (2007: 14). As Una Chaudhuri points out, theatrical performance 
is complicit in this denial as it masks nonhuman elements and patterns of 
ecological destruction, that is, of ‘ecocide’ and of ‘eco-cruelty’ (1994; 2014a). 
As twenty-first-century performance represents human identity diversity, it 
also reinterprets and reinvents some of the ways in which theatre has always 
accorded human emotions to nonhuman worlds and other animal species in 
both positive and negative ways.
The nonhuman is being used in this book to encompass a general sense of 
the surrounding living world and other animal species and relevant examples of 
the symbolic staging of inorganic materials and objects are also included. This 
is not to reject the recent use of ‘ecology’ to indicate an integrated relational 
field within performance (e.g. Lavery 2015: 167). I hold that nonhuman forms 
are selected from the larger environment to be indicative of it, and of human 
to nonhuman relations within drama, theatre and performance, even when the 
human is decentred. The natural surroundings including the biological world 
and its ecological systems are encapsulated by a selective artistic process.
The forms that grab spectator attention in theatrical performance are 
multidimensional, engaging the emotions, thoughts and sensory feeling as 
they generate meaning. Emotion, however, is not culturally neutral and the 
choices of theatre and its specific forms implicitly convey significance. It can 
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be presented as having a separating effect, as isolating, alienating. At the same 
time, drama can describe, and theatrical performance can stage, ideas of free-
dom within unifying emotional experience.
Hannah Arendt contends that to ask ‘what is freedom?’ seems a ‘hopeless 
enterprise’ given the contradictions of ‘consciousness’ and ‘conscience’ and 
how human lives face uncontrollable occurrences and external ‘causation’ 
(1961: 143) Freedom often becomes ‘a mirage of the moment’ and Arendt 
reiterates that it is not a pure inner sense or an outer sensory phenomenon, 
and it is not metaphysical and about free will, but neither is it reliant on rea-
son or science, and it arises instead within ‘everyday life experiences’ (1961: 
144). Freedom is a process of political action that emerges from the context 
of natural processes and human evolution, and ‘historical processes that are 
created and constantly interrupted by human initiative’ (1961: 170). Although 
the work of Michel Foucault reveals how the body-subject is constituted 
through cultural constraints that seem inescapable, an everyday freedom 
emerges from unpredictable capacities that overturn preconceptions (Oksala 
2005: 13). As well as pointing out some of the ways emotional feeling is 
freed-up in responding to the nonhuman world, Forms of Emotion explores 
theatrical recognition of the diversity of human lives in which freedom needs 
to be experienced through everyday feeling.
Historically, theatre was considered a repository of specialist knowledge 
about the passions (Roach 1985). The emotions were embodied to be artisti-
cally and culturally symbolic. When Susanne Langer writes that ‘[a]rt is the 
creation of forms symbolic of human feeling (1953: 40), ‘feeling’ is understood 
as straightforwardly universal. This is no longer the case. Anthropological 
studies of cultural difference in the emotions and emotional feeling that con-
solidated during the 1980s challenge the belief that feeling is universal and 
natural. These proved foundational to the recognition that gender, racial, 
sexual and cultural identity differences impact on emotional experience (e.g. 
Lutz 1988). Yet early-twentieth-century political ideas evident in Bertolt 
Brecht’s (1987) epic theatre had recognized the cultural causation of emo-
tional feeling while adhering to a modernist scientific separation of thought 
and emotional feeling. Theatre practices undermine belief in human same-
ness. Furthermore, theatrical performance pre-empts concepts developed in 
Émile Durkheim’s anthropological study and Erving Goffman’s sociological 
study that distinguished private feeling from public displays, masks and roles 
(Plamper 2015: 84). Theatrical performance not only reflects and reacts to the 
changes in beliefs about the function of emotion, it sometimes precedes them 
and potentially influences them.
As ideas of the subjective experience of the emotions shifted over time, 
theatre changed accordingly. In justifying tragedy in theatre, Aristotle 
expected audiences to think about the emotions of the narrative, reflecting a 
belief that emotional feelings followed from mental states (see Chapter 2). By 
1884, William James with Carl Lange (1967) argued that bodily felt responses 
precede mental impressions proposing that physiological feeling happens 
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prior to thought. This reordered psychological emphasis on emotional feel-
ing coincided with early realism and Constantin Stanislavski’s adaptation to 
acting and his active analysis pre-empts later psychological developments (see 
Chapter 4). Overt and covert beliefs about emotion coincide with recent the-
atrical experience and its presentation of diverse cultural identities and forms 
of realness. Artistic forms of emotion coexist with social forms.
Recent theatrical scholarship reflects the spectrum of intellectual develop-
ments as it illuminates some key aspects of emotion: the evocation of feeling 
and in distinct genres (Hurley 2010; Welton 2012); affect in political perfor-
mance (Dolan 2008; Thompson 2011; Alston 2016; Diamond, Varney and 
Amich 2017); affect and emotional extremes evoked by contemporary perfor-
mance (Doyle 2013); the emotions in ancient Greek and Shakespearean the-
atre (e.g. Escolme 2014; Visvardi 2015; Arab et al. 2015; Dunbar and Harrop 
2018); cognition and empathy in audience reception (e.g. McConachie 2008; 
Shaughnessy 2012); and the acting of feeling and in relation to neuroscientific 
research (e.g. Blair 2008; Kemp 2012; Neuerburg-Denzer 2014). Some schol-
arship encompasses a specific emotion. There is a gem about Brecht’s embar-
rassment over his class position cited in Nicholas Ridout’s materialist account 
of the production of the male spectator (2020: 149). Shame is extracted as 
performers grapple with acting as well as parody it (e.g. Bernstein 2012). The 
consideration of emotion in theatrical performance offers a wide spectrum of 
intriguing possibilities.
In the twenty-first century, disciplinary forms of knowledge about the 
human emotions and emotional feeling in society can be scientific, philo-
sophical, psychological, biological, anthropological and sociological (e.g. 
Arnold 1960; Lutz 1988; Harré and Parrott 1996; Panksepp 1998; Williams 
2001; Damasio 2003; Stets and Turner 2006; Goldie 2012a), as well as political 
(e.g. Goodwin et al. 2001; Ahmed 2004). The foundational scientific study of 
physiological emotion, however, is bound up with nonhuman animal exper-
imentation (e.g. LeDoux 1996). When emotional feeling is studied within 
social communication, it is words that confirm emotions such as love and 
hate, and attach to individual experience so that interpretations align with 
cultural learning. A twentieth-century distinction between the physiology of 
emotional feeling and ideas or impressions of the emotions, however, contin-
ues to be the basis of study, even in neuroscience (Damasio 2004). Emotional 
feeling is considered naturally biological or culturally conditioned or a com-
bination of both (e.g. Ekman and Davidson 1994), so the concept remains 
unstable even in its study. Clearly biology and culture are intertwined. Studies 
in the twenty- first century find neurodiversity even in the electrical-chemical 
impulses by which brain cells and sections communicate (Critchlow 2019).
The quest to establish basic emotions across cultures by mid- twentieth-
century empirical studies using posed facial expressions, establish some com-
monality in expression (Ekman and Friesen 1975). But they do not prove a set 
number of biological emotions or that physiological experience is universal. 
The arguments about whether an emotion is both semantic and physiological 
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are unresolved in studies of facial expression (Parkinson, Fischer and Manstead 
2005: 57, 58). Recent neuropsychological research contends that participants 
infer but often unreliably predict a feeling from a facial expression (Barrett 
et al. 2019). The recognition that emotional feeling saturates communica-
tive processes and language confirms the challenges of cross cultural analysis 
(Wierzbicka 1999). There are measurable differences in studies of participant 
responses to posed versus spontaneous expressions, and professional actors 
largely display stereotypical expression (Krahmer and Swerts 2011). Moreover, 
some emotions do not equate with facial expressions and not all cultures are 
orientated to facial exchange. The divergent interpretation of human emo-
tional experience reflects malleable biological systems and social condition-
ing. Beliefs and practices within cultures, including those of performance, 
determine emotional recognition. The understanding of a range of emotions 
in other species, including empathy – at best an extension of Darwin’s obser-
vational studies – is comparatively recent and, even with inherited capacity, 
these studies suggest that animal emotions can be acculturated in response to 
humans (e.g. Bekoff 2007; de Waal 2010). While the capacity to interpret a 
specific emotion from a human facial expression in Western culture remains 
contested, it is clear that individuals distinguish ‘calm’ from ‘agitated’, ‘pleas-
ant’ from ‘unpleasant’ in what is termed the ‘valence’ of feeling (e.g. Kagan 
2007; Barrett 2018: 72). The communication of positive or negative emotion 
across cultures, even between species, happens in a general way.
The emphasis in this book on Western theatrical traditions reflects the 
difficulty of interpreting, even translating, specific emotion in different per-
formance cultures. Theatrical emotion benefits from a culturally informed 
study as a researcher such as myself may recognize a positive or negative 
effect but overlook inflections and inherent beliefs (see Chapter 6). Yet the 
value of learning from different cultures is immense. For example, the Indian 
performance tradition is unquestionably part of twentieth-century theatrical 
knowledge internationally. For example, in Phillip Zarrilli’s (2009) approach 
to kathakali and kalaripayattu in performance training, as well as in Richard 
Schechner’s (2001) interpretation of rasa from The Natyashastra, an ancient 
text from India (see Tait 2021). While this absorption creates intercultural 
or transcultural innovations, Jan Plamper points out that the faces displaying 
each rasa in The Natyashastra differ from everyday expression – and differ 
from the facial expressions used in Paul Ekman’s search for universality – 
and performed rasa in combination with music has a unifying effect, like 
‘embodied thought’ (2015: 112). Ideas of rasa support longstanding claims for 
a distinctive domain of emotional experience happening within theatrical 
performance.
Performance practice involves working with the emotions, emotional feel-
ing and mood and affective sensation, even though these remain challenging 
to explain. The doing of emotion in performance becomes meaningful. 
The theatrical languages that present emotion engage with social prac-
tices, so emotion can be reproduced without necessarily being cognitively 
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questioned. The felt responses evoked in the reception of a theatrical perfor-
mance are commonly acknowledged with a general comment or a first-per-
son description. My initial consideration of affect in performance analysis 
seemed to come out either as a generalization or a personal statement. I real-
ized that affect – like the theatrical reception of emotional feeling – remains 
speculative rather than substantiated. A generalization about emotion in 
theatre obviates the diversity of distinctive performance genres, histories 
and spaces – not to mention spectators and cultures – whereas a subjective 
response to a performance may be idiosyncratic rather than attributable to 
others. To generalize that emotional feeling and affect happen seems self- 
evident, but to proclaim, even inadvertently, that an audience felt a specific 
emotional feeling is nonsensical. Unified audience feeling can be one more 
theatrical illusion.
Emotion, too, is described within a unifying general explanation, even as 
specific examples of what is individually felt and imagined are recognized. As 
Elspeth Probyn writes about shame, ‘An epistemological point hovers in the 
background: a precise emotion demands precise description. It is the preci-
sion of a description that allows for the larger comprehension of what affects 
and emotions can do’ (2005: 137). An emotion such as shame is socially com-
municated within a particular set of circumstances but these also undergo 
change over time. Theatrical performance reflects this process as it utilizes 
specific words and phrases in its creative processes, so that a linguistic inter-
pretation underpins the general effect.
Forms of Emotion contends that the separating and unifying tendencies of 
the emotions, emotional feelings, mood and affect become evident in the way 
drama, theatre and contemporary performance present forms that are human 
and forms that implicate the nonhuman. A tendency to unify or separate can 
be identified in the tensions between what is general and specific, abstract and 
actual, impersonal and personal, shared and subjective, inhibited and unre-
strained. The book’s thematic emphasis develops as follows. Chapter 1 probes 
recent affect theory about human sensitivity to unifying free-flowing non-
human energies as it distinguishes impersonal affect from the artistic inten-
tion of theatrical performance and personal feelings. Chapter 2 examines 
Aristotle’s unifying continuum in which thinking of the emotions leads 
to emotional feeling, and facilitates judgement and belief in human sepa-
rateness from nonhuman species and nature. Chapter 3 scrutinizes the long-
standing theatrical precept that confessions of subjective emotional feeling 
cannot be trusted and, while oaths of allegiance historically sought to over-
come interpersonal separation, twentieth-century psychological appraisal 
theory reconfigures it. Chapter 4 considers how modern drama depicts the 
bodily phenomena of emotional feeling and mood in an inherently thea-
tre-like exchange as it unifies individual and social moods within an aes-
thetic mood and points to phenomenological freedoms. Chapter 5 considers 
twentieth-century dramatic theory that separates cognitive thought from 
emotional feeling to reveal general structural forces in society, and while 
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this supports the separation of trauma’s affect, twenty-first century polit-
ical performance seeks to unify with its evocation of empathy. Chapter 6 
probes the convergence of subjective and shared experiences of love and 
fear in theatrical performance that champions freedom of emotional feeling 
as a human right. Chapter 7 investigates how symbolic and living nonhuman 
birds and animals in drama and performance are framed within anthropocen-
tric emotionalism that, while reflecting a controlling unifying perspective, 
paradoxically also conveys care and concern for animal lives. An explora-
tion of inspiring contemporary Indigenous performance in Chapter 8 reveals 
how it evokes affect that unifies and draws in subjective emotional feeling 
to encourage awareness that humans are inseparable from the nonhuman 
world and its species. Chapter 9 explores how small, incremental shifts in 
performance create prosodies of movement and emotion and counteract sep-
arating emotional feelings about climate futures with unifying affect and 
mood. As theatrical forms overcome the perception of separation between 
human and nonhuman forms, they inspire feelings of emotional freedom.
Chapter summaries
Forms of Emotion explores concepts of emotion including theories of affect 
in relation to artistic forms of drama, theatre and performance. It outlines 
ways in which theatrical forms of knowledge about emotion in well-known 
canonical drama and its performance align with concepts in interdisciplinary 
studies of emotion. While the expression and display of the emotions is a 
direct effect of performance, the evocation of emotional feeling is more indi-
rect, and affect and mood arise at the edge of perception. A performance can 
be evaluated for its separate elements and its unifying synthesis.
Chapter 1, ‘Affect Theory and Performance Intention’, explores the inter-
sections of affect theory and performance theory about ‘live’ and ‘presence’ 
in relation to the robot actor in Rimini Protokoll’s Uncanny Valley. It encom-
passes how affect was formerly interchangeable with emotional feeling but 
twenty-first-century applications accommodate theory about technology 
and impersonal energy moving freely across human and nonhuman realms 
(Massumi 2002; Brennan 2004; Clough 2007a; Blackman 2012). Recent 
affect theory about unifying nonhuman energies can be distinguished from 
the personal psychologies presented in performance – and therefore, as Ruth 
Leys (2011, 2018) argues, from intention. Chapter 2, ‘Judging Pity, Fear and 
Humanness’, examines some of the ways in which the emotions are drama-
tized and precipitate catharsis. In Aristotle’s (1995) analysis, the emotions are 
unified as thought leads to emotional feeling and audiences make judgements 
about the characters in tragic narratives that arouse pity for someone else 
and fear for oneself. While political productions of Sophocles’ (2004) play 
Antigone continue to invite emotional judgement, it is human separateness 
from nonhuman species and nature that is maintained by Antigone’s compas-
sionate action of burying her brother to restore his human identity.
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Chapter 3, ‘Appraising Emotional Feeling’, explores how Shakespeare’s 
King Lear, and productions with a Queen Lear and a First Nations Lear, 
offer a cautionary warning of the disastrous consequences of believing oth-
ers who eloquently proclaim feelings of love. While performative speech 
acts can be duplicitous, nonetheless a performance might inspire feelings 
of love. Theatre illuminates the separation between the expression of emo-
tional feeling and actual experience, a separation that historical oaths of 
allegiance sought to overcome (Reddy 2001), and twentieth-century psy-
chological appraisal theory and linguistics reconfigure through the concept 
of prior orientation (e.g. Lazarus 1991; Frijda 2004). Chapter 4, ‘Performing 
Moods, Tears and Bodily Phenomena’, considers drama by Anton Chekhov 
and Samuel Beckett that presents emotional feeling and mood as embodied 
experience within a theatrical-like exchange that unifies aesthetic, individual 
and social moods. Modern drama is thoughtfully analysed for its depiction 
of nonhuman landscapes and symbolism (e.g. Fuchs and Chaudhuri 2002; 
Lavery and Finburgh 2015). These dramatic depictions explicitly encompass 
the way human emotional feeling and mood converge with nonhuman phe-
nomena in psychological precepts, and in ideas of  phenomenological feel-
ing and its freedom (Merleau-Ponty 1995; 1996). Chapter 5, ‘Political Belief 
and Social Cognition of Emotions’, dissects Bertolt Brecht’s (and Margarete 
Steffin’s) Mother Courage and Her Children and Caryl Churchill’s Far Away 
from the perspective of Brecht’s argument for the separation of thought and 
emotional feeling in his scientific theatre that should elicit cognitive under-
standing rather than audience empathy. This perspective further supports the 
theoretical separation of affect and emotional feeling in performance about 
trauma. Approaches in recent scholarship and in theatre, including Nick 
Payne’s Incognito, however, recognize the unifying perspective of brain–body 
neuroscience and value contradictory emotions in the political evocation of 
empathy and enjoyment (e.g. Williams 1977; Ahmed 2004; Thompson 2011).
Chapter 6, ‘En/Acting Diverse Emotional Freedoms’ presents theatrical 
performance about the human right to freely experience and express emo-
tional feeling as being inseparable from democratic rights. Belarus Free 
Theatre’s Minsk, 2011: A Reply to Kathy Acker presented the state repres-
sion of emotional expression in theatre about fear, protest and human 
rights. Productions by Belarus Free Theatre, Split Britches and Liao Yimei’s 
Rhinoceros in Love directed by Meng Jinghui indicate how theatrical per-
formance contributes to political struggles for emotional freedom. Chapter 
7, ‘Animals and Anthropocentric Emotionalism’, investigates how symbolic 
animal forms are framed by anthropocentric emotionalism in drama ranging 
from The Birds by Aristophanes to Rhinoceros by Eugène Ionesco, and to offer 
a unifying human perspective that also paradoxically contains concern for 
other species. Contemporary performance with living animals that evokes 
affect challenges the presumption that animals should embody human-like 
emotions, and yet it reveals how human emotional responses to them can 
be protective. Chapter 8, ‘Enveloping the Nonhuman’, considers physical 
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performance that decentres the human form in movement and presents dif-
ferent patterns of human relations with the nonhuman world. Performances 
by Australian Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander dance theatre compa-
nies, Marrugeku and Bangarra, reflect an artistic capacity to creatively incor-
porate nonhuman animals and the environment, and to enhance spectator 
perception with affect and emotional feeling, as they point to traditional 
knowledge that the human is inseparable from the nonhuman world and its 
species. Chapter 9, ‘Prosodies of Affect and Emotional Climates’, explores 
how small, incremental shifts in the movement and emotion of contempo-
rary performance create prosodies that counteract separating tendencies and 
unify through participating action. Everyday practices of walking, talking 
and moving and immersion in nonhuman worlds evoke emotional and affec-
tive responses: in the Fluid States Greenland event co-ordinated by Sisters 
Hope; in Robert Wilson’s performance of John Cage’s Lecture on Nothing; and 
through their absence in Latai Taumoepeau’s Repatriate 1. Performance forms 
that blur the distinction between spectator and performer require trust and 
evoke hope with stirring, arousing and inspiring prosodies that counteract 
moods of eco-anxiety and fear.
Forms of Emotion reflects my ongoing fascination with emotions, emotional 
feelings, mood, and visceral and bodily sensation, the latter grouped in this 
book under affect. The capacity to interpret nonhuman animal behaviour 
through human emotional experience points to the ways in which humans 
project their emotions on to others and the surrounding environment (Tait 
2012; Tait 2015a). The human emotional perception of the nonhuman needs 
to be questioned in order to understand how it conditions both the destruc-
tion and also the preservation of what is vitally important for survival.
Framing the emotions, emotional 
feeling, mood and affect
Multiple concepts – emotions, emotional feeling, sensation (sensate feeling), 
affect, mood and passion – are in wide use but with varied application and 
inconsistent definition. Their usage can be confusing. Marta Figlerowicz 
contends that there ‘is no single definition of affect theory’ that spans neuro-
science and psychoanalysis, psychology and sociology (2012: 3). Alex Houen 
discerns that there is interchangeable usage in the humanities between ‘feel-
ing’, ‘emotion’ and ‘affect’ in the current practice of theory (2011: 218). Terms 
do need to be qualified to avoid confusion, not least because the meaning 
of ‘affect’ has expanded with recent theory to encompass the nonhuman 
world and phenomena that are ‘open to effects from contiguous processes’ 
(Blackman and Venn 2010: 7). Forms of Emotion distinguishes between ‘the 
emotions’, ‘emotional feelings’, ‘mood’ and ‘affect’ under the general label 
of ‘emotion’ by combining sensation and sensate visceral responses with 
affect and recognizing emotional feeling to accommodate personal psychol-
ogy. ‘Passion’ is acknowledged as a generic historical term. Emotions have 
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histories; Aristotle’s pride is not the same as gay pride (Gross 2006: 18). The 
objects of emotions vary historically and culturally. Concepts of emotion are 
introduced here and discussed further in the chapters of Forms of Emotions.
The emotions are fascinating. Ideas of love, sadness, fear, joy, anger 
and disgust – also shame and despair – remain recognizable in lasting ways, 
although the general term that encompasses them changed over time. The 
inclusion of a particular passion (emotion) did vary historically and the 
English word ‘emotion’ from the Latin emoveo that meant ‘to move’, had 
appeared by the seventeenth century (Broomhall 2016b; Rosenwein and 
Cristiani 2018: 11). Lexicons not only reveal omissions and which emo-
tions matter but also the emphasis given to an aspect of meaning that varies 
over time (Frevert et al. 2014). Theatre reflects the way particular emotions 
remain interpretable ideas even as the general umbrella term changes, when 
for example, the word ‘emotion’ replaced ‘passion’ and ‘sentiment’ as the 
general noun during the nineteenth century, and ‘emotional feeling’ came 
into wider use in the twentieth century (also see Tait 2021). Jan Plamper jus-
tifies the use of ‘emotion’ as a ‘meta-concept’ to reconcile divergent historical 
and contemporary strands of study while recognizing that it is also used as 
a synonym for ‘feeling’ (2015: 12). But as outlined below, theatrical knowl-
edge needs to make a distinction because it cannot assume that performing 
a specific emotion involves the performer feeling it. Forms of Emotion uses 
‘emotion’ as the general unifying category for four concepts to recognize the 
historical significance of theatre knowledge and its emotional legacies, while 
including twentieth-century ideas of emotional feeling and artistic mood, 
and twenty- first-century theory that expands the concept of affect.
Even the use of a unifying term is contested when Joseph LeDoux (1996) 
argues that fear is not the same as jealousy. But Jerome Kagan contends that 
it is language that leads to these differing definitions and since verbs for 
emotions need context (2007: 129). Philip Fisher explains: ‘What remained 
unchanged, when the passions came to be called the emotions, were the 
words for the specific passions or emotions’ (2002: 6). He is confirming that 
specific emotions remain recognizable, and an idea of pity for others and 
fear for oneself – in Aristotle’s famous example – can be interpreted today, 
even though ‘pity’ has largely been supplanted by ‘sympathy’ from the eight-
eenth century and thereafter by ‘empathy’. In relation to linguistic difference, 
Brecht’s theatre and ‘empathy’ (coined in English in 1909), David Krasner 
points to empathy’s originating German meaning of ‘“ feeling into”’ in rela-
tion to the older concept of sympathy as ‘“feeling with”’ (Krasner 2006: 
264, 266). Understanding of the emotions intersects with developments in 
cultural language and belief, including those about physical and social free-
doms. Historically, beliefs about the body influenced those about emotions, 
including, for example, medieval bodily humours and nineteenth-century 
hysteria that were explored in theatre (e.g. Roach 1985; Finney 1989; Paster 
2004; Marshall 2016). In a history of the emotions, Barbara Rosenwein and 
Riccardo Cristiani summarize historical studies of the emotions, and within 
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overviews of human society, including in the unifying, civilizing process 
identified by Norbert Elias in the 1930s (2018: 32). Yet a particular emo-
tion such as love or anger within historical drama remains interpretable, 
irrespective of the originating social circumstances and historically specific 
beliefs. Cultural processes revive concepts such as that of ‘biophilia’, as they 
create new words such as ‘solastalgia’, which describes a type of homesick-
ness for what is lost environmentally in the twenty-first century (Albrecht 
2019). Although the ‘emotions are not feelings’, they are associatively con-
nected, and since ‘emotions are about something’, this gives them intention 
(Solomon 2003: 57, 58, italics in original). The emotions can be interpreted 
and explained to others, and while language for specific emotions invariably 
reduces and objectifies experience – a problem that confronts their study – it 
nonetheless remains viable for communication. The emotions are delineated 
by intention, causation and action and can be analyzed.
Emotional feeling implicates physiological experience that is felt, in con-
trast to how language and a word typifies an emotion. But since emotional 
feeling is believed to fuel action and behaviour in the moment, it can be the-
atrically enacted. Martin Welton (2012) describes ‘shows of feeling’ by per-
formers, practices that point to the theatrical interpretation of feeling, which 
he explains is also evident in its absence. Theatre has long reflected social 
concern with the consequences of emotional feeling and the traditional idea 
of succumbing to ‘passion’ depicts feeling that overpowers self-control (Fisher 
2002: 6, 7). Theatrical passion presents moral warnings about adverse conse-
quences (Roach 1985). The enactment of feeling that is happening inside the 
body remains challenging to perform, and knowledge about whether human 
and nonhuman animal feeling originates in the brain stem or the cortex and 
how it biochemically happens is less useful to theatrical performance than 
patterns of interpretation. Philosopher, Robert Solomon, explains that no 
single mode of analysis holds for emotional feeling, which was traditionally 
distinguished from a bodily feeling such as thirst, and it can be delineated in 
at least five ways: through behaviour and/or verbal and bodily expression; 
within physiology; in perception and its phenomenology; through cognition 
including appraisal; and within a social context (2004: 13). These aspects of 
emotional feeling can be identified in theatrical performance through the 
characterization, narratives, embodied performing and the spectator experi-
ence of integrated effects. As Kagan points out, however, research findings 
on behaviour or brain activity or semantics depend on the framing mode of 
measurement – and minimizing researcher bias (2007: 139; 190–197). An 
adjustable framework is also applicable to theatrical performance.
Historically, the emotions were considered to be mental processes that 
induced emotional feeling (see Chapters 1 and 2). William James with Carl 
Lange (1967) in what is called the James-Lange theory challenged the pre-
vailing assumption in the study of emotion by arguing that bodily feeling 
precedes thought. James (1918) draws attention to the physiological changes 
of the body that precede awareness, but he recognizes highly variable 
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experience for each instance of feeling. An argument ensued in the twentieth 
century as to what extent emotional feeling is stimulated within the body’s 
internal physiology or requires external provocation (see Chapter 3). James’s 
approach emphasizing bodily feeling over mental processing was challenged 
by appraisal theory that finds feeling arises from orientation and cognition 
(e.g. Lazarus 1991; Frijda 1994; Frijda 2004). Later approaches to appraisal 
controversially include perception that is a preconscious interpretation of 
the surrounding environment (Forgas 2000b: 5). Although recent science 
confirms the neurobiology of, for example, the production of oxytocin and 
vasopressin in the hypothalamus of humans and animals, bodily feeling is 
considered inseparable from social (species) circumstances (Kagan 2007: 
156–158). Emotional feeling implicates perceptual engagement within the 
surroundings, including the nonhuman world.
A social idea of an emotion is distinguished from an ‘emotional feeling’ 
within the twentieth-century study of emotion – if not in everyday worlds 
(Damasio 2004). The separation of an idea of an emotion and bodily feeling 
is helpful for performers and theatre artists. Peter Goldie explains that an 
emotional feeling in the everyday world can involve a subjective intention, 
and happens in a complex, dynamic process encompassing ‘episodes of an 
emotional experience, including perceptions, thoughts and feelings of var-
ious kinds’ and ‘the different elements of the emotion are conceived of by 
us as all being part of the same emotion’ (2000: 12, 13, italics in original). 
Emotional feeling can be experienced bodily in ways that can be separated 
out and analyzed, even as it resists objectification with words. The arousal 
of an emotional feeling such as fear or anger is intermittent, so it can attract 
self-awareness – if not self control – as it happens.
An emotional feeling is understood in ways that are individualized and 
personalized in Western culture, so it has a separating effect. It can be 
expressed and communicated with words and/or behaviour or it can remain 
unexamined and undetermined. But even where emotional feeling is associ-
ated with a commonly understood word, such as frustration or disappoint-
ment, the experience can be questioned by others. Firstly, it is uncertain if 
the particular emotional feeling happens, even if it is described. Secondly, 
emotional responses differ between people, so one person is pleased when 
another is embarrassed. Thirdly, someone might experience an emotion such 
as disappointment more intensely, or at least claim to do so. Emotional feeling 
is also associated with the imagination (Morton 2013), and the imagination 
is crucial in performance and in the acting of emotion (Stanislavski 2010; 
Kemp 2012). The variability in emotional feeling complicates the delivery 
and evocation of emotions in performance, and explanations that translate 
felt experience invariably rely on a presumption that feeling happens.
The ways in which a creative writer translates feeling into words is often 
simply accepted as an artistic capacity. A linguistic description suffices for the 
existence of the feeling. Yet how words and sets of words evoke a felt response 
is a wondrous puzzle – one that besets its linguistic study and troubles the 
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practice of interpreting drama in performance. Embodied processes are an 
important part of the artistically created holistic effect but are difficult to sepa-
rate out as they happen. While the words for the emotions invariably function 
as cultural markers for what is being felt, performance suggests that feeling is 
inseparable from the body’s expressive muscles and movements; these unifying 
bodily processes impact on the interpretation and meaning. It is often only 
possible to explain emotional feeling within the cultural sphere by presuppos-
ing the consequence of the process of feeling. A specific word stands in for the 
process of emotional feeling that imbues and surrounds language.
Mood is less specific than an emotional feeling and considered sharable 
(Roberts 2003; Felski and Fraiman 2012; Ratcliffe 2012). The word ‘mood’ 
has its origins in Anglo-Saxon language and its historical usage originally 
meant strongly felt states of mind (White 2016). Mood commonly refers to 
an individual’s everyday emotional experience over time, a psychological 
condition. Kagan describes clinical distinctions in types of mood (2007: 28). 
But as director Vsevolod Meyerhold (1969) recognizes in the early twentieth 
century, mood can describe the stylistic effect of a performance. It offers a 
tantalizing mysterious mood quality in both realist and nonrealist forms that 
audiences puzzle over. Aesthetic mood refers to the effect of a whole produc-
tion or a section of the staging that absorbs spectator awareness.
Rita Felski and Susan Fraiman evaluate whether the distinctive qualities of 
mood can contribute to recent studies of affect, given that mood remains a 
key concept in everyday use (2012: v). They suggest that the language about 
affect as ‘intensities and flows’ does not align with how mood is described as 
more lasting and creating ‘diffuse, hazy and intangible’ atmospheres (Felski 
and Fraiman 2012: v). In explaining how the experience of literature can be 
mapped as it produces felt responsiveness in a reader, Jonathan Flatley con-
nects feeling with how a text achieves mood (2008: 7). Flatley considers that 
literary mood emerges fluidly at the nexus of personal and cultural experi-
ence. Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht (2012) contends that reading induces an inner 
experiencing of an atmosphere or mood within a continuum that is similar 
to that of a musical scale (2012: 4). Music is pervasively used in twenty- 
first-century theatrical performance, and mood is included in the study of 
emotion in music (e.g. Robinson 2012), and in film (e.g. Smith 2003). In an 
exploration of cinema’s aesthetics of mood, Carl Plantinga explains that artis-
tic mood reflects ‘human mood’, by which he means capacities for ‘seeing’, 
‘experiencing’ and ‘perceiving’ (2012: 469). While mood suggests a synthe-
sis that can take over someone in an audience, a mood effect needs to be 
sustained for as long as it takes to become recognizable. A reader/spectator 
makes an effort to connect with what touches felt sensibility. Mood in per-
formance contains the possibility of impacting on individual mood as well as 
being shared by an audience so it can illuminate social mood.
Aesthetic mood is comprehended even as it eludes possession. Felski and 
Fraiman suggest that mood can offset the criticisms of affect that it upholds 
a dichotomy with materiality and does not accommodate subjective feeling. 
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Mood is pre- and post-cognitive and ‘muddies distinctions between the sub-
jective and the objective’ (Felski and Fraiman 2012: vii). Martin Heidegger 
(2001) contends that humans are never without mood in the Heideggerian 
ontology of being and concept of presence (see Chapter 4). Mood can also 
suggest that the social and society coalesce in different ways and, for example, 
align with Bruno Latour’s rejection of ‘separateness’ and of ‘a place, a thing, a 
domain’ and his preference for a ‘movement of new associations’ (1993; 2005: 
238). Aesthetic mood can explain a shared experience in performance as it 
also creates an effect that lingers after a performance finishes.
Affect has expanded in meaning in the twenty-first century to offer a 
unifying concept that includes ‘in-between-ness’ (Seigworth and Gregg 
2010: 1). While some newer usage is clearly associated with an emphasis 
on the human body, affect’s older significance that was synonymous with 
emotional feeling has become disrupted and often omitted. There is a bipar-
tite distinction in recent analysis between the emotions (and/or emotional 
feelings) that are socially and culturally recognized, and bodily feeling – 
affect – as ‘the biological and physiological experience’ (Probyn 2005: 25). 
While previously associated with emotional feeling, affect now often refers to 
physiological responses and processes per se. Probyn opts to use affect as a 
general concept to include ‘innate affects’ of the body in her discussion of 
social shaming and blushing, because when ‘shame is analyzed from a social 
point of view, its genesis in the body is denied’ (2005: 27, 29). This criti-
cism can be applied to how the emotions as social concepts are distinguished 
from emotional feeling as bodily experience. But there is variation in the 
bipartite distinction and its interpretations (e.g. Scheer et al. 2019). As well, 
there is a clear tripartite ‘emotion, feeling and affect’ in political analysis 
(e.g. Hutchinson and Bleiker 2019). In a general analysis of aesthetic form, 
Noel Carroll distinguishes between feeling and constructed emotion by 
contrasting artistic and viewer values (1999: 172). In cinema, Carl Plantinga 
(2012) distinguishes constructed emotional expression and mood from the 
affect of bodily felt responses in viewer reception. In his explanation of bore-
dom in film viewing, John Rhym points out that it is difficult to discuss 
affectivity without discussing emotional feeling because of boredom’s refusal 
to engage with ‘empathy, identification and affective comportment’ (2012: 
479). A bipartite distinction between ‘affect’ that identifies bodily feeling 
and social ideas of ‘emotion’ (e.g. Wetherell 2012) does not fully serve the 
processes of making performance and audience reception. As Adam Alston 
recognizes, ‘affect’ and ‘emotion’ in theatre are ‘entwined’, but individuated 
and specific as an ‘influence’ on thought and behaviour (2014: 222).
An expanded concept of ‘affect’ highlights energetic movements and incor-
porates ideas of bodily sensations that are not expressly emotional (Massumi 
2002; Brennan 2004; Gregg and Seigworth 2010). These are the bodily 
pulses, tingles, auras, slight involuntary movements and contractions within 
continuous processes and include those that are preconscious. The intensity 
of a pulsation might momentarily attract self-awareness. Figlerowicz explains 
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‘affect theory is grounded in movements or flashes of mental or somatic 
activity rather than causal narratives of their origins and end points’, and 
in constituting knowledge and subjecthood (2012: 4). Significantly, recent 
affect theory elaborates on thought as a stimulus for bodily feeling (Williams 
1977). As affect theory encompasses how thought happens bodily with ener-
getic shifts and tinges, it becomes a useful concept for performers. Raymond 
Williams explains, ‘thought as felt and feeling as thought’ creates a structure 
and a social experience (1977: 132). Theatre, screen and social media expand 
on the literary forms that reveal what Williams calls ‘structures of feeling’. 
Nigel Thrift reiterates that ‘affect is understood as a form of thinking, often indi-
rect and nonreflective’ in his consideration of ‘spatialities of feeling’ in urban 
space and the messiness of the world (2008: 175). Thrift describes technol-
ogy creating a ‘new structure of attention’ that reveals what was formerly 
not deemed perceptible and not distinguished in a large number of ‘practi-
cal knowledges’ that design space for an affective response (2008: 186, 187). 
Technologies that make affect perceptible are used by political groups seeking 
to gauge the ‘intensity of feeling and the general quality of mood’ – meaning 
social mood (2008: 250). Thrift’s summary of approaches to affect recognizes 
that knowledge of specific emotional feelings has often been individualized 
and separated, the context removed, whereas Deleuzian ideas of affect offer 
a unifying capacity.
Most importantly, as recent affect theory highlights sensitivity to energetic 
flows and movements, it obviates the separation of the human body from 
its surroundings and from others. It flattens or displaces an emphasis on the 
human body as it recognizes nonhuman objects, natural surroundings and 
animal species, and technology. But this all-encompassing affect seems too 
big, too general, for consideration of a theatre performance without further 
refinement. As Félix Guattari writes, ‘as soon as one decides to quantify 
an affect one loses its qualitative dimensions’, and its ‘singularization’ (1996: 
159). Affect ‘sticks to subjectivity’ since it is not discursive (Guattari 1996: 
158). But the converse is also being argued when affect is theorized and con-
sciously used in discourse (e.g. Wetherell 2012).
A tendency to use ‘affect’ interchangeably with ‘subjective feeling’ per-
sists. Teresa Brennan usefully specifies ‘the things that one feels are affects’ 
but ‘one feels with’ feelings (Brennan 2004: 23). Affects are products of 
affective processes. Sara Ahmed uses ‘affect’ as a noun to mean sensation 
and/or emotional feeling (2010: 25). At the same time, affect can be defined 
as a verb (Wetherell 2012). The surroundings can be affecting. But affect 
is considered an immediate effect rather than a purposeful feeling of the 
type created with representation. Affect theory is connecting society and 
nature, body and mind through concepts such as ‘assemblage, flow, tur-
bulence, emergence, becoming’ and to accommodate ‘affective labour’ 
and the ‘economization of affect’ in a digital algorithmic economy in the 
twenty-first century (Clough 2007a; Blackman and Venn 2010: 7). Affect 
allows recognition of non-conscious experience, of ‘sensation, memory, 
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perception, attention and listening’, and addresses Latour’s question ‘“What 
can a body do?”’ (Blackman and Venn 2010: 8, 9). This corresponds with 
the longstanding question in performance: what is the performer doing? 
Rosenwein and Cristiani explain that ‘as theories of emotions emphasize 
ever more strongly the “cognitive” nature of emotions, affect theorists 
have allotted to affects the realm of the irrational, […] the pre-conscious, 
pre-emotional, pre-verbal forces in our lives’ (2018: 17). Affect is being the-
oretically separated from the emotional experience of a psychological self 
(Blackman 2012). Hence a distinction between emotional feeling and affect 
in relation to performance allows for personal responses and psychologies 
to be recognized, as well as sensitivity to affect that is impersonal, even 
formless (see Chapter 1).
Theatrical performance grabs attention in ways that are assumed rather 
than discussed, including through energetic movement. Bodily affects are a 
precondition for theatrical performance, which sets out to draw individual 
and collective attention. Affect theory suggests paying attention to different 
types of ‘attention’, to expose how culture trains a focus (Blackman and Venn 
2010: 9, italics in original). In recognizing the affect of attention, queer the-
ory questions to what extent this happens from conscious choice rather than 
unconscious, embodied processes (Ahmed 2010).
A separation of bodily sensations and the emotions is not new. Aristotle 
grappled with how selective emotional feelings might be considered responses 
to thought and distinguished from precognitive drives or sensations of the 
body (Fortenbaugh 2002: 9). Neuroscience confirms a separating delay of a 
fraction of a second in the body’s conscious awareness of electrical impulses 
and chemical changes in bodily feeling (e.g. Damasio 2003). It reveals feel-
ing being activated in response to a trigger but does not effectively explain 
the complexity and uniqueness of individual self-awareness and control. 
Moreover, the capacity for (emotional) feeling within brain–body biology 
does not disprove cultural habituation. A trajectory of performance within 
evolutionary biology, in ‘bioculturalism’, only reinforces generalization 
(Grodal 2009), and can seem incongruous within scientific research based on 
nonhuman animal emotions (e.g. McConachie 2008). Theatre knowledge 
would suggest that affective sensation and emotional feeling arise in relation 
to performance forms, but within the diversely habituated patterns of bodies, 
events, things and sensory impressions. It confirms James’s ideas of variance 
for each instance (Barrett 2018: 39). Theatrical performance reveals emo-
tional diversity.
‘Affect’ is being applied as a general umbrella term in the twenty-first 
century in literary studies (Wehrs and Blake 2017; Ahern 2019). This is 
an application to the analysis of language-based texts, rather than to visual 
embodied texts of performance. In sociology, Margaret Wetherell advocates 
studying patterns of ‘affective practice’ that incorporate human emotion, psy-
chology and receptivity to what can be nonhuman, noting that the turn to 
affect marks ‘ontological and epistemological upheaval’ (2012: 2–4, italics 
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in original). Similarly, Monique Scheer (2012) also argues for locating the 
emotional body within social practice. In compiling episodes of momen-
tary ‘ordinary affects’ that can be public and personal, interestingly, Kathleen 
Stewart notes ‘trajectories, connections and disjunctions’ rather than overall 
unities (2007: 5). Wetherell points out that abstract theory can undercut some 
sociological scholarship when it collapses material practices and categories 
together, ignoring historical legacies, and she criticizes scholars who ‘cherry- 
pick’ from other disciplines or rely on one theorist (Wetherell 2012: 10). 
Methodological approaches in affect are questioned (e.g. Blackman and Venn 
2010; Leys 2011). Although Wetherell is pointing out that some applications 
of affect theory can be unconvincing, she argues that affect theory offers a 
discursive field and with semantic meaning even as it claims non-cognitive 
bodily processes (2012: 20).
I agree that it is necessary to (discursively) explain how a term such as 
‘affect’ is being used, since its general significance has greatly expanded. As 
Alston contends about immersive performance, ‘affect is not reducible to the 
orchestration of visceral processes alone’, a faster ‘heartbeat’, ‘goose bumps’ 
(2016: 42, 44). ‘Affect’ is used in Forms of Emotion to acknowledge the sensory 
processes of the body, and its sensations, viscerality, processes of thought and 
sensitivity to the surroundings, but decoupled from concepts of emotional 
feeling while coupled with a general pervasive nonhuman energetic field 
(see Chapter 1). For example, affect can denote sensory responses to darkness 
in theatrical space without implicating an emotional (fear) response to the 
dark (Welton 2012; Alston and Welton 2017). Since performance analysis 
also needs to convey what is specifically evoked within a social and artistic 
exchange, it is better served by recognizing multiple types of bodily feeling – 
from tingling to emotional – and because an artistic effect can have personal 
and social consequences.
Affect theory offers a unifying concept for feeling and sensation, and larger 
energetic dynamism that crosses and imbues organic and nonorganic forms 
(see Chapter 1). Affect circulates across multiple large and small forms in 
flows that are considered impersonal (Massumi 2002; Brennan 2004). Affect 
theory reveals connections that are circular and layered rather than linear, 
and emerge around, within and through social forms. But how these intersect 
often seems oblique. As affect unifies the energetic field, it is not altogether 
clear how it connects with specific personal awareness; affect can seem imag-
inary. Performance analysis needs to do more than assume that performer 
feeling and spectator engagement converge in the application of affect theory 
to its materiality and vital energies.
Affect theory and new materialism are among the theoretical approaches of 
the ‘nonhuman turn’ and Grusin points out that this ‘embodied turn toward 
the nonhuman world’ in discourse becomes ‘a means of translation or medi-
ation in the Latourian sense’ (2015: xx). Affect in ‘new materialisms’ consti-
tutes vitality and exchanges across and around bodies but is not dependent 
on human self-feeling (Morton 2007; Bennett 2010). Accordingly, recent 
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philosophical approaches and new materialisms deploy affect in a general-
ized effect within nonhuman surroundings and energies. These gain trac-
tion, however, by connecting with lived experience and in relation to, for 
example, fear of something (Massumi 2010). The human emotions shadow 
affect as it circulates within socio-biological worlds and across nonhuman 
organic and inorganic materiality. Rosi Braidotti (2013) uses the term ‘the 
posthuman’ to encompass new materialism, emotions and ideas of becoming 
machine. While this is applicable to how performance presents objects and 
technological and unifying cyborgian effects (e.g. Parker-Starbuck 2011), the 
word ‘nonhuman’ has been used in animal studies over decades to remind 
humans that they are animals.
Forms of Emotions contends that the movement of affect intersects with the 
processes for the emotions, emotional feelings and mood in performance that 
sustain attention and are interpretable. This convergence creates an oscillat-
ing spectrum of emotion. The emotions and emotional feeling are presented 
and expressed within theatrical languages, and even though mood and affect 
suggest more elusive experience, these, too, can be perceived within the the-
atrical form. New materialist discourse about flows of affect and intensities 
revitalize performance knowledge and analysis in the twenty-first century.
Theatrical performance is the result of the collective endeavours of per-
formers and other artists who interpret the text, and the music and technical 
effects, which encourage the willing involvement of audiences. The overall 
effect can be greater than the sum of the parts when the accumulative quali-
ties in the visual and aural languages of theatre and performance accord with 
the sensibilities of an era. Twenty-first-century staging, in conjunction with 
advanced technological and digital effects and music, shapes how emotion 
connects performer and spectator and the subjective and shared experience 
of performance.
Performing is not feeling that emotion
The possibility that a specific emotion such as love or fear can be imitated, 
expressed and interpreted without being bodily felt is a foundational precept 
within theatrical performance. An emotional feeling needs to be performed 
rather than experienced by performers. The gap between acted emotions 
and what is being felt by the actor is called ‘Diderot’s Paradox’ (Diderot 
1957). In the eighteenth century, Denis Diderot (1957) argues that to repli-
cate the bodily signs and sounds of an emotional feeling, a good actor relies 
on technique to sustain the effect within a dramatic structure. The performer 
does not feel what is being acted because it would overwhelm the delivery. 
Diderot recognizes that a performer’s observations of emotional expression 
in life need to be reproduced through effective acting. Stanislavski recog-
nizes that feeling is difficult to act, and a performer’s bodily feeling dif-
fers from that of the character or persona (Tait 2002; Neuerburg-Denzer 
2014; Tait 2021). Empirical research interviewing actors conducted in the 
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late-twentieth-century concluded that the particular emotions of the charac-
ter are not those being experienced by actors (Konijn 2000).
Theatrical knowledge assumes that performing an emotion is not inter-
changeable with feeling it, and the context underpins communication of 
emotional feeling. As Welton reiterates, theatre’s capacity to offend histori-
cally came from the possibility that actors do not feel what they act (2012: 6). 
Plato was concerned that performance with its falseness would impact on 
social behaviour and Aristotle (1995) highlights the narrative, placing less 
emphasis on a performer’s delivery. In the development of his psychological 
principles, however, James (1918) quotes William Archer’s collation of actors’ 
descriptions of physiological change while acting emotional feeling. Theatre 
has been a source of ideas about emotions as it reflects philosophical argu-
ments including those developing from the 1960s that the subjective feeling 
of another cannot be experienced (Bedford 2003). While doubt that a par-
ticular emotion was being felt became the basis of condemnation of theatre 
historically, bodily reactions such as tears and facial expressions are perform-
able and recognizable.
A performer’s bodily experience during performance remains one of the 
more perplexing elements of theatre. It is recent affect theory that offers a 
more nuanced possibility that thought is accompanied by bodily sensations 
and these are fundamental to performing. Even if a performer is not angry or 
in love, his or her (their) bodily expression relies on what has been developed 
in rehearsal (training) so its impact in performance is a compounded effect of 
bodily striving to embody targeted feeling. The repetitive practice of arous-
ing but containing expressive feeling becomes convincing and it involves 
intentional change. The carefully crafted elements in theatre and contempo-
rary performance that demonstrate meaning include embodied physiological 
cues developed during training and preparation. Significantly, then, theat-
rical performance presents embodied expression derived from the practice 
of doing feeling. Above all, the interpretation of emotions and emotional 
feelings in performance relies on a culturally recognizable display.
The possibility that theatrically performed emotion is a distinctive cate-
gory of physiological and reflective experience remains. It can be intensely 
felt by audience members and yet differ from that in everyday life. Although 
the emotional tenor of a historical production remains elusive, theatrical per-
formance has a long tradition of explicitly and implicitly telling its audiences 
how to respond and stimulating preferred responses, including feelings. The 
felt responses of spectators are considered fundamental to theatre and per-
formance forms (e.g. Hurley 2010; Welton 2012), and indicative of a willing 
engagement. Emotional feeling happens in reception.
Audiences respond with feeling to familiar patterns and to their disrup-
tion, although styles of expression in performance do change and acquire 
more (or less) subtly. Changes in emotional delivery seem comparable to 
how stage design changes over time. Theatre offers what Bruce McConachie 
terms ‘situated cognitions’, including in empathetic engagement, and while 
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he draws on scientific understanding of human physiology, he compares its 
attraction to the focus achieved with a follow spot (spotlight) (2008: 16, 24). 
McConachie argues that in general, ‘embodying other’s emotions produces 
emotions in us’ (2008: 67). But this is not an automatic effect. Theatrical 
impact relies on artistic intention to gain spectator attention, but the compo-
sition of an emotional feeling varies between individuals and theatrical con-
text and identity elicits diverse responses. Removed from the circumstances 
of an actual performance and its audience members, the proposition that per-
formance evokes feeling remains a general statement of possibility supported 
by brain–body physiological science. Neuroscience and functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) of the brain determine where a feeling response 
might happen and that the body responds to sensory stimuli. They do not 
confirm that these actually happened during a performance. The physicality 
and verbal description of a character(s) or persona(e) contributes to emotional 
meaning, but even with social ideas and embodied forms, the emotions and 
emotional feelings can seem paradoxical and contradictory, slippery and mer-
curial, fluid and nebulous.
I observe that actors – like everyone – often converse about emotions as if 
they were universal and transparent, and Brecht’s (1987) ideas of their cultural 
production and decades of studies of gender, racial and cultural difference 
have not disturbed such precepts (e.g. Lutz 1988; Grima 1992). Performance 
practices and languages can benefit from interdisciplinary studies of emotion. 
Actors might need to believe in the transparency of emotional expression, 
but changes in acting styles over time obviously contradict an assumption of 
timelessness. The way social languages are embedded within theatrical emo-
tions remains implicit, and thinking about performed emotion long preceded 
Brechtian distancing. The performance of emotions should not be unexam-
ined imitation and performance-makers need to explore all the imagined 
spaces of emotion, between and across the general and specific elements of 
theatre.
Performers need productive ways to think about emotion in relation to 
embodied practice, and to facilitate working with ideas of the emotions and 
translating these into bodily expression. Is it bodily sensations accompanying 
thought and words for love and anger that are being physically trained? My 
earlier work argues that the emotions and emotional feelings are reasoned 
and performable in theatrical languages, and that gender identity difference 
creates a logic for the emotions acted in early realism (Tait 2002). Emotions 
are performative, their meaning stabilized through, and in, the embodied 
languages of theatre.
The performer and the spectator are conditioned by exposure to theatrical 
and cinematic performance over time, although the accumulated systems of 
knowledge about how to perform emotions are often overlooked in analysis 
of their impact. Carl Plantinga acknowledges that the emphasis in twenti-
eth-century cinema scholarship has been on meaning and cognitive mes-
sages, in line with a scientific rejection of emotion in ‘neo-Brechtian screen 
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theory’ (2009: 4). He explains that since the emotions in film are structured 
by the narrative and to develop alliances with characters, the emotions invite 
spectators to pay attention as they respond to form and its convention. But 
analytical disinterest may also reflect that it is acting theory and practice that 
have been preoccupied with the emotions in the twentieth century (Tait 
2002; Tait 2021). Certainly recent studies of the emotions in cinematic rep-
resentation illuminate their central importance to analysis of its reception (e.g. 
Grodal 1997; Smith 2003; Plantinga 2009). The performance of emotions in 
contemporary live and screen performance in the twenty-first century has 
significance for the general understanding of emotion and its social manip-
ulation. Performance makes it possible to appreciate beliefs about socially 
derived emotions and emotional feelings, and their consequences at the limits 
of expectations and tolerance, without necessarily experiencing them.
The growing influence of affect theory in performance analysis expands 
concepts of feeling to include bodily sensations – including those accom-
panying thought – as well as energetic movements across bodies and the 
conceptualization of human experience in relation to the nonhuman and 
technology and digital media in the twenty-first century. Ideas of affect con-
front unpredictability as a practical as well as theoretical artistic problem and 
are analogous to social and political situations. In practice, theatre and per-
formance involve conscious choices and deliberate intentions for particular 
effects often based on precedent and imitation. But aesthetic practice also 
implicates prior patterning and unconscious and involuntary input in relation 
to the emotions, emotional feelings, mood and affect. In addition, the per-
formance of emotional feeling is not simply interchangeable with audience 
reception, since artistic intention may or may not succeed, and performance 
can have unintended effects. Although it is deliberately and carefully created, 
complex intermediary processes potentially modify, transform and manipu-
late responses.
An originating (bodily) feeling in theatrical artistry may not exist, but nei-
ther does feeling simply circulate freely in a theatrical context. Performance 
invariably highlights both compliance and defiance in the emotions and 
emotional feelings, because of its imitative processes, and these connect with 
mood and affect. It invites performer(s) and viewer(s) to engage in a process 
with thought or feeling or both that challenges beliefs about emotion.
Forms of Emotion explores theoretical, theatrical and social perspectives 
of forms of emotion in drama, theatre production and contemporary per-
formance. The analysis encompasses longstanding interpretations in theatre 
and therefore in society, as well as recent performance practices that subvert 
convention. Social understanding of diverse human to nonhuman forms of 
emotion can be illuminated by drama, theatre and performance.
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